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Quantitative analysis has influenced and sometimes transformed 
many disciplines, including economics, finance, and public policy—
even wine production, movie production, and athletic recruiting.1 Its 
popularity varies, however, depending on whether its methods appear 
to produce results. For example, the “quants” who made portfolio 
management a science began to receive blame in 2008 for deflating 
the economy. Warren Buffett was particularly biting: “[B]eware of 
geeks bearing formulas.”2 In sports, some teams have considered 
firing scouts who judge prospective players by watching them play 
and instead evaluating talent based on empirical evidence of 
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 1. IAN AYRES, SUPER CRUNCHERS: HOW ANYTHING CAN BE PREDICTED 1–9, 64–80, 
144–49 (2007); Dennis Overbye, They Tried to Outsmart Wall Street, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2009, 
at D1 (quoting Warren Buffet). 
 2. Overbye, supra note 1. 
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performance.3 Empirical enthusiasts claim that statistics reveal 
valuable information that the plain eye and intuition overlook. But 
critics argue that the empirical movement shortchanges the value of 
traditional analytical methods. 
Empirical scholars have begun to train these same tools on the 
judiciary. They have studied topics ranging from the economic effects 
of judicial systems to the influence of ideology on judicial 
decisionmaking. Unfortunately, empiricists have often failed to 
consult their studies’ subjects—participants in the judicial system—
about their research premises. At the same time, many in the legal 
system know little about this literature. Those few lawyers, legal 
scholars, and judges who are aware of empirical findings have often 
openly resisted them, particularly those studies that emphasize the 
attitudinal model, which, in its strongest form, claims that judges 
decide cases based on their policy preferences rather than legal 
doctrine. The attitudinal model, they say, betrays a cramped view of 
the law and represents a fundamental misunderstanding of what 
judges do. 
Despite these criticisms, the still-nascent field of empirical legal 
studies is growing. As databases become more comprehensive and the 
technology necessary to process data improves, empirical scholars are 
likely to produce more and more sophisticated analyses of legal 
decisionmaking.4 But what has the discipline offered the law so far? 
Many courts already use data-driven analyses to improve 
administrative functions, such as assigning cases, monitoring potential 
biases, and creating issue-specific courts. If quantitative approaches 
are valuable in these areas, could they also offer useful lessons for 
traditional legal analysis? In light of the legal community’s objections 
that empiricists fail to understand how lawyers and judges really 
argue and decide cases, we thought it would be useful to bring 
empirical scholars and the people they study together for a day of 
discussion. 
The conference focused on several questions: 
1. How, if at all, can quantitative measurements explain judicial 
behavior? 
 
 3. See generally MICHAEL LEWIS, MONEYBALL: THE ART OF WINNING AN UNFAIR 
GAME (2003) (describing the rise of quantitative scouting in baseball); Michael Lewis, The No-
Stats All-Star, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2009, at MM26 (describing the same in basketball). 
 4. See AYRES, supra note 1, at 130–44 (detailing advances in empirical tools and studies). 
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2. What objective criteria for evaluating judicial decisonmaking 
would help judges improve? 
3. Why do judges resist the attitudinal model and other models of 
judicial behavior? 
4. How could researchers adjust their models or methods to 
better reflect how the legal system operates? 
This Symposium emerged from Dean David Levi and Professor 
Mitu Gulati’s course at Duke Law School on the study of judicial 
behavior. Dean Levi, a former federal district judge, and Professor 
Gulati, whose work includes empirical studies of the judiciary, helped 
us assemble a group of empirical scholars to present papers and 
professors and judges to respond. Trial and appellate judges came 
from federal and state courts from across the country. Many of them 
have held administrative roles within the judiciary in addition to their 
day-to-day courtroom duties. Some judges were familiar with the 
empirical literature; others were not. The same was true of the 
doctrinal scholars we invited. This mix, we hoped, would provide a 
range of perspectives to improve future empirical research and the 
legal community’s familiarity with the empirical literature. 
The day-long conference, held on February 6, 2009, did not 
disappoint. Sometimes disagreeing and often agreeing, our 
participants covered a variety of the literature’s strengths and 
weaknesses. In the pages that follow, several issues recur. 
First, what data are relevant? Dean Levi, in his review of Judge 
Posner’s book, How Judges Think,5 faults Posner for ignoring 
unpublished dispositions.6 If one wants to know how judges think day 
to day, Levi argues, ignoring cases that do not make it into the 
reporters—the vast majority—does little to enhance understanding of 
how judges usually think.7 In unpublished opinions, judges may 
approach cases differently. If one asks a slightly different question—
what is the effect of a particular rule—one would want to see how 
judges apply the rule in all cases, including unpublished ones.8 Using 
only reported cases provides a narrow, possibly misleading sample, 
whereas incorporating unpublished opinions would enable a lawyer to 
 
 5. RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK (2008). 
 6. David F. Levi, Autocrat of the Armchair, 58 DUKE L.J. 1791, 1801–04 (2009) (reviewing 
POSNER, supra note 5). 
 7. Id. at 1803. 
 8. Id. 
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make an empirical argument about how the rule actually works.9 
Consider United States v. Leon,10 in which the Supreme Court refused 
to apply the exclusionary rule to evidence officers obtained 
unconstitutionally when the officers reasonably relied on an invalid 
warrant.11 According to the Court, the exclusionary rule, which 
prevents future misconduct by threatening that courts will exclude 
illegally obtained evidence, was inappropriate because the officers did 
not know they were violating the Constitution. After all, the Court 
implied, officers will not adjust their behavior to conform to 
constitutional rules when they believe they are already following the 
law. In his concurrence, Justice Blackmun observed that the 
majority’s decision rested on an empirical judgment about the effects 
of the exclusionary rule—a judgment the Court should be prepared to 
reconsider based on new empirical evidence. Unpublished 
dispositions would provide the data necessary to evaluate Leon’s 
effects and whether the Court should reconsider that decision.12 
Second, how should scholars design empirical studies of legal 
decisionmaking? For example, once a scholar decides what to test, 
how does the scholar weigh the data? Professors Brennan, Epstein, 
and Staudt suggest that the Supreme Court may have consciously 
aided the Roosevelt administration’s economic program during the 
Great Depression.13 Comparing the percentage of pro-government 
votes in tax cases during a routine downturn and during the Great 
Depression, the professors determine that the Court voted more 
often in favor of the government during the Great Depression than in 
other periods, whereas the Court tended to vote against the 
government during routine downturns and for the government during 
normal periods of economic growth.14 Professor Young and Ms. 
Blondel respond that Brennan, Epstein, and Staudt’s approach is 
misleading because looking only to the number of pro-government 
 
 9. Id. 
 10. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). 
 11. Id. at 900. 
 12. To a large extent, this disagreement over how to handle unpublished opinions in the 
datasets likely reflects the legal community’s disagreement regarding which opinions courts 
should publish and what weight courts and lawyers should give unpublished opinions. 
 13. Thomas Brennan, Lee Epstein & Nancy Staudt, Economic Trends and Judicial 
Outcomes: A Macrotheory of the Court, 58 DUKE L.J. 1191, 1196 (2009). 
 14. Id. at 1221. 
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case outcomes ignores the relative significance of cases.15 For 
example, in United States v. Butler,16 the Supreme Court struck down 
a key piece of New Deal tax legislation,17 which “in its practical 
significance . . . may outweigh five or ten ordinary victories in 
ordinary tax cases.”18 Young and Blondel’s criticism implies that when 
assessing how the Court decides cases in an area of law, the most 
important variable is the net effect of the Court’s decisions, not the 
number of the Justices’ votes. This discussion about how to measure 
particular variables that may determine studies’ outcomes will 
continue to receive serious scrutiny. 
A third and related issue is distinguishing empiricists’ descriptive 
and normative claims. For example, Professors Choi, Gulati, and 
Posner rank state supreme courts based on three measures: 
productivity, opinion quality, and independence.19 To measure these 
subjective characteristics, they use the number of published 
opinions,20 out-of-state citation numbers,21 and how often a judge 
votes with opposite-party judges,22 respectively. The authors concede 
that these proxies are imperfect.23 Determining the right proxies 
involves, as Dean Chemerinsky points out, difficult normative 
choices.24 Choosing one definition of quality judging necessarily 
excludes other important measures, and because empirical studies 
need quantifiable data, they may rely too heavily on measurable 
criteria and neglect important but hard-to-measure criteria. Chief 
 
 15. Ernest A. Young & Erin C. Blondel, Response, Does the Supreme Court Follow the 
Economic Returns? A Response to A Macrotheory of the Court, 58 DUKE L.J. 1759, 1771–33 
(2009). 
 16. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936). 
 17. Id. at 74. 
 18. Young & Blondel, supra note 15, at 1770. 
 19. Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Eric A. Posner, Judicial Evaluations and Information 
Forcing: Ranking State High Courts and Their Judges, 58 DUKE L.J. 1313, 1320 (2009). 
 20. Id. at 1320. 
 21. Id. at 1321. 
 22. Id. at 1323. 
 23. Id. at 1314; see also Scott Baker, Adam Feibelman & William P. Marshall, Response, 
The Continuing Search for a Meaningful Model of Judicial Rankings and Why It (Unfortunately) 
Matters, 58 DUKE L.J. 1645, 1647 (2009) (“[W]e strongly suspect that the attributes that the 
authors select . . . constitute relatively minor aspects of judicial quality.”); Laura Denvir Stith, 
Response, Just Because You Can Measure Something, Does It Really Count?, 58 DUKE L.J. 
1743, 1748 (2009) (criticizing the authors’ judicial-quality metric as encouraging a “numbers 
game” that emphasizes “quantity over quality”). 
 24. Erwin Chemerinsky, Response, No Warrant for Radical Change: A Response to 
Professors George and Guthrie, 58 DUKE L.J. 1691, 1700–01 (2009). 
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Justice Stith of Missouri observes that preferring measurable criteria 
can create bad incentives to improve in the rankings instead of 
improving real quality.25 These difficulties, which the authors 
acknowledge,26 will generate controversies over any decisions to use 
proxies, especially in sensitive areas such as judicial rankings. 
Fourth, what role should empirical conclusions have in crafting 
policy? Professors George and Guthrie determine that the Supreme 
Court would reach the same decision in vast majority of cases if it sat 
in panels.27 From this foundation, they argue that the Court should sit 
in panels so that it could correct lower courts’ errors more often, 
leaving the en banc procedure available for contentious cases.28 Judge 
Boudin29 and Dean Chemerinsky30 accept their premise, but they 
reject George and Guthrie’s proposal. Boudin argues that the Court’s 
primary function is not, and should not be, error correction.31 Circuit 
splits are not a significant problem; far more important is that the 
Justices have time to decide cases of national importance and serve as 
ambassadors for the judiciary. Chemerinsky argues that the Court’s 
en banc hearings are so ingrained that a Court sitting in panels would 
lack legitimacy.32 Additionally, he points out that it is difficult to 
determine which cases actually present errors the Court needs to 
correct, suggesting that the problem George and Guthrie seek to 
solve may simply be a phantom.33 
Finally, the legal community has greeted many empirical findings 
skeptically. Professor Richman suggests that legal professionals may 
simply feel uncomfortable embracing unfamiliar empirical analyses by 
nonlawyers who disregard more traditional forms of legal reasoning.34 
Richman attributes the resistance to empirical evaluations of judicial 
behavior in part to the legal community’s strong sense of 
 
 25. Stith, supra note 23, at 1748. 
 26. Choi et al., supra note 19, at 1313 (acknowledging that the measures are “coarse” 
(italics omitted)). 
 27. Tracey E. George & Chris Guthrie, Remaking the United States Supreme Court in the 
Courts’ of Appeals Image, 58 DUKE L.J. 1439, 1462–65 (2009). 
 28. Id. at 1453–68. 
 29. Michael Boudin, Response, A Response to Professors George and Guthrie, Remaking 
the United States Supreme Court in the Courts’ of Appeals Image, 58 DUKE L.J. 1685 (2009). 
 30. Chemerinsky, supra note 24. 
 31. Boudin, supra note 29, at 1685–86. 
 32. Chemerinsky, supra note 24, at 1698–700. 
 33. See id. at 1694 (“But to speak of ‘errors’ is to beg enormously difficult questions as to 
what is ‘correct’ as opposed to ‘erroneous.’”). 
 34. Barak Richman, Response, On Doctors and Judges, 58 DUKE L.J. 1731, 1740 (2009). 
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professionalism, which may cause lawyers to discount outsiders’ 
evaluations merely because they are not members of the community.35 
On the other hand, some in the legal community object that 
empiricists overlook how conventional legal explanations can inform 
empiricists’ hypotheses or explain their findings.36 Many participants 
also suggest that how empiricists approach and describe their studies 
may contribute to mutual wariness. In particular, empiricists 
frequently charge that judges make decisions based on “politics,”37 
which unfortunately resonates with popular debates about judicial 
activism and conflates judges’ long-acknowledged discretion when 
deciding difficult cases with “political” decisionmaking.38 Judge 
Boudin and Dean Levi therefore ask scholars to use the term 
“politics” more carefully.39 In addition, any claim that judges operate 
beyond the bounds of law is a serious one, and the legal community is 
likely to react negatively.40 
We convened the Duke Law Journal Conference on Measuring 
Judges and Justice so that empirical scholars and legal professionals 
could discuss these issues. All of the articles presented at the 
conference follow, and some of the judges and doctrinal legal scholars 
also chose to publish their responses. We hope this issue provides an 
overview of the contributions that empirical scholars have tried to 
make and some criticisms of their efforts. To the extent this 
Symposium succeeds, we have our participants to thank. 
 
 35. See id. at 1740 (“[J]udges and legal academics often exhibit disregard for, and often 
hostility toward, outsiders who employ nonlegal analytical methods to assess judicial quality, 
understand judicial reasoning, or predict judicial outcomes.”). 
 36. See, e.g., Young & Blondel, supra note 15, at 1772 (suggesting that “conventional legal 
explanations may well resolve” some of Professors Brennan, Epstein, and Staudt’s findings). 
 37. See, e.g., J. Mark Ramseyer, Predicting Judicial Outcomes Through Political 
Preferences: The Japanese Supreme Court and the Chaos of 1993, 58 DUKE L.J. 1557, 1558–59 
(2009) (arguing that judges “indulge their political biases” from the bench, but that their ability 
to do so is an indicator of judicial independence). 
 38. H. Jefferson Powell, Response, A Response to Professor Knight, Are Empiricists 
Asking the Right Questions About Judicial Decisionmaking?, 58 DUKE L.J. 1725, 1725–26 
(2009). 
 39. Boudin, supra note 28, at 1689 (“Figuring out why judges decide cases the way they do 
is a worthy enterprise; not so scoring judicial results as ‘political.’”); Levi, supra note 6, at 1795 
n.15 (calling Judge Posner’s use of the word “political” “unfortunate”). 
 40. See, e.g., Baker et al., supra note 23, at 1641 (“[I]t is troublesome to think that [Justices 
would] decid[e] cases based on economic conditions unrelated to the merits of the legal issue 
before them. They have no constitutional authority to act in this manner.”). 
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